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Advertising Law and Product Liability
Robert B. Dunsmore*
P ERHAPS A QUICK LOOK AT THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY will better
enable us to form an opinion about the real merits of the
liability imposed on a manufacturer as a result of representations
made in his advertising.'
Overall View of Advertising Industry
Advertising is by no means a creation of modern times. It
was fairly wide-spread in the English-speaking world three cen-
turies ago. In 1660 these familiar assertions appeared in a British
weekly: "Most Excellent and Approved Dentrifice to Scour and
Cleanse the Teeth, Making Them White as Ivory; Preserves from
Tooth-ache, It Fastens the Teeth, Sweetens the Breath, and
Preserves the Gums and Mouth from Cankers and Impos-
thumes ... " 2
The ancestors of the modern advertising agency began to ap-
pear in this country around 1800. Initially, newspapers appointed
stationers, booksellers, or even postmasters to collect and for-
ward advertisements with a small commission for the job. By
the 1830's, there were advertising agents devoting free time to
the job, and about this time, some of them broadened their
spheres of operations and began serving many newspapers simul-
taneously. Around the 1850's, the agents began severing their
loyalties to newspapers and struck out on their own. They char-
acteristically sold advertising to merchants and businessmen,
then bought space to fill the orders. By the time of the Civil War,
the order of these transactions was commonly reversed, i.e., the
agencies bought space of their own, and assumed the risk of
reselling it. This brokerage operation expanded steadily during
the remainder of the nineteenth century. For a considerable
period of time, some "space merchants" resumed their position
as formal agents of the newspapers; they regularly disposed of
all or part of the various papers' advertising space.
* B.A., Pennsylvania State University; second-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
1 See, Fortune, The Amazing Advertising Business (1957).
2 Id, at ix,
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No very exact date can be put on the time when agencies
began to regard the advertisers, rather than the newspapers, as
their real customers. This development occurred over a period
of several decades in the latter part of the nineteenth century,
and it was fostered by the growing demand of advertisers for
more service from the agencies, especially for more help in the
preparation of ads. Just who were the first copywriters and art
directors is a question impossible to answer today.
In 1955 there were some 3300 advertising agencies employing
about 45,000 people; of these four major companies 3 did fourteen
percent of the business while the top twenty-five did thirty-six
percent of it. The total spent in national advertising expenditures
in 1955 was 5.3 billion dollars; in 1956 close to six billion.4
The total annual volume of advertising in the United States,
national and local, is running close to ten billion dollars, just
about triple the 1946 figure. 5 In 1957 there were nineteen com-
panies6 which spent over ten million dollars each for advertising
their products and services, and there were over a hundred com-
panies that spent two million each or more. Gross advertising
revenue for the three TV networks, magazine, and Sunday maga-
zine sections reached an all time high of 1,368,322,511 dollars.7
An industry break-down of expenditures follows: s
3 Id. at 94. The big four being Thompson; Young & Rubicam; McCann-
Erickson; and Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn.
4 Id. at 84.
5 Id. at 81. According to Jones, Law of Journalism, 298, the figure was near
the two billion dollar mark in 1940.
6 The top ten advertisers were:
Procter & Gamble $57,191,511
General Motors 41,834,224
Chrysler 30,945,944
Colgate-Palmolive-Peet 29,078,118
Ford 28,082,142
General Foods 28,061,402
Lever Bros. 23,565,993
American Home Products 22,431,011
Bristol-Myers 19,503,362
R. J. Reynolds 19,159,901
7 2 National Advertising Investments 7 (1957).
8 Ibid.
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Industry Expenditure in Three Media: General and National
Farm Magazines, Sunday Magazine Sections, and Network
Television
1957 1956 1955
Food and Food Products $204,203,569 $188,281,965 $176,059,421
Toiletries and Toilet Goods 159,067,661 139,330,634 127,191,376
Automotive, Automotive Accessories
and Equipment 125,856,466 128,884,067 114,418,384
Soaps, Cleaners, Polishes 87,816,337 77,543,801 61,606,152
Drugs and Remedies 83,057,303 68,576,176 49,194,915
Smoking Materials 79,087,401 61,005,285 62,994,214
Industrial Materials 73,158,866 71,074,231 57,389,303
Apparel, Footwear and Accessories 63,442,225 63,884,789 59,297,784
Household Equipment and Supplies 62,625,942 80,543,532 74,092,540
Beer, Wine and Liquor 49,847,339 40,444,330 43,037,915
Radio and television, of course, have done much to increase
the advertising volume in the past few decades. The number of
people that can be reached now by one television commercial
was almost unheard of ten years ago In viewing these statistics,
it is not surprising that people are brand conscious. And in the
above summary no statistics are provided for small newspaper
and magazine advertising, local radio, directories, and many other
media wielding great total effect.
In 1905, the Associated Advertising Clubs of America was
formed and in 1929 the organization became the Advertising
Federation of America, the National Association of Better Busi-
ness Bureaus being affiliated with it. 1 0 Some of the flagrant
misuses of advertising, which organized advertising is fighting to
abate, may be listed as follows: 11
9 ARB Network TV Ratings for the Week of Jan. 5-11, 1958
Total viewers
reached
1. Gunsmoke Liggett & Myers, Sperry Rand, CBS 51,290,000
2. Perry Como Several sponsors, NBC 50,670,000
3. Steve Allen Several sponsors, NBC 42,920,000
4. Tales of
Wells Fargo American Tobacco, Buick, NBC 39,390,000
5. Have Gun,
Will Travel Whitehall, Lever, CBS 38,470,000
6. Wyatt Earp General Mills, Procter & Gamble, ABC 37,260,000
7. General Electric
Theater General Electric, CBS 36,950,000
8. Wagon Train Several sponsors, NBC 36,930,000
9. Lassie Campbell Soups, CBS 36,230,000
10. Father Knows
Best Scott Paper, Lever, NBC 36,160,000
10 Kenner, Fight for Truth in Advertising 18 (1931).
11 Id. at xvii-xviii. As to some of the bad practices in the advertising busi-
ness itself, see, Oleck, Watch Out For Ad Rackets, 86 American Mercury
(408) 89 (Jan., 1958).
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1. Misleading statements, insinuations, exaggerations, and
illustrations that give impressions of value, quality or
service not inherent in the product.
2. Suggestions of cures and palliatives, and lures of beauty
and health building, not founded on scientific fact.
3. Part-truths of scientific information that imply a benefit
not supported by science.
4. Indecent copy, and pictures that violate privacy.
5. Testimonials that are not honest or honorable in their
implications.
6. Comparative prices that are exaggerated or misleading.
7. Predatory price cutting and the use of "baits" to mislead
the public.
8. Claims of general underselling not capable of proof and
untrue in their insinuations and impressions.
9. Unfair attacks, actual or implied, on competitors or com-
peting products.
In 1929, Milton Handler discussed some of the deceptive
advertisement problems prevalent then, and made some criticism
and suggestions concerning these problems.12 He pointed out
that it was the modern temper to turn to the law for the solution
of pressing social problems, but whether the solution to the prob-
lem of false advertising was thus to be found, he was unable to
say. However, he did think that much could be accomplished by
the legal devices then available. The devices mentioned were
grouped as follows: (1) civil action available to the party ag-
grieved; (2) proceedings in which the state is a party; (3) sanction
of various kinds which indirectly tend to discourage false adver-
tising.
He summed up the discussion of group (1) by writing that
it was apparent that the traditional actions of deceit and warranty
as developed by the courts could be of little utility in a campaign
against false advertising. The difficulties of group (1) are dis-
cussed in the history of negligence and warranty in the preceding
pages of this Symposium. As to the second and third groups, we
still have the same organizations and the same fruitless attempts
by the state and federal agencies set up to police this area.
Handler bemoaned the influence of the friendly doctrine of
"seller's puffing" to shield the advertiser from liability. He sug-
gested that if such statements as, "These second hand tires are as
12 Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 34 Yale L. J. 22 (1929).
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good as new," 13 "This suit of clothes will wear like iron," 14 "We
are in a position to guarantee them to be all that is claimed for
them, perfect of their kind," 15 or "This article will give first class
satisfaction, it is the best upon the market, it will sell like hot-
cakes and will be the best drawing card ever handled," 1 are to
be regarded as puffs, then all the copywriter has to do is to give
free rein to his fancy and avoid conveying any useful information
about the article.
Finally, he applauded the steps toward regulation by the
Federal Trade Commission and other governmental agencies, but
drew the conclusion that in spite of all the then-existing legal
devices, false advertising would not be materially abated until
a new business psychology was born, with regard for the truth
and aversion for falsity, plus further education of the public to
demand useful and truthful information. Here was a task for the
educator and missionary, an opportunity for the trade association;
the lawyer could do little." 17 His pessimism was well-founded-
proved by many a blatant or tricky ad "pitch" today, almost
thirty years later.
Governmental Regulation
The attempts by government regulators to control false ad-
vertising are headed by the Postal Regulations, the Federal Al-
cohol Administration, the Federal Food and Drug Administration,
and the Federal Trade Commission.
The agency which exercises the most control over advertis-
ing is the F. T. C.18 Originally, it was established to determine
whether an advertisement or representation amounted to unfair
competition, a tendency to mislead, irrespective of intent, and a
probable diversion of trade. Its aim was to protect the competi-
tor. However, the courts have since construed the act creating
the F. T. C. to be designed to prevent the purchaser from being
13 Warren v. Walter Auto Co., 50 Misc. 605, 99 N. Y. Supp. 396 (1906).
14 Harburger v. Stern Bros., 189 N. Y. Supp. 74 (Sup. Ct., 1921).
15 League Cycle Co. v. Abrahams, 27 Misc. 548, 58 N. Y. Supp. 306 (Sup.
Ct., 1899).
16 Detroit Vapor Stove Co. v. Weetel Lumber Co., 61 Utah 503, 215 P. 905
(1923).
17 Handler, op. cit., n. 12, at 29.
1 10 Advertising Age 35 (August 28, 1939).
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defrauded.19 In 1938, the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Act 20
signified that Congress approved the F. T. C.'s belief that direct
protection of the consumer from deceptive advertising was as
equally important as that of the preservation of competitors.
In 1911, the Printer's Ink Publishing Co., Inc. sponsored the
Printer's Ink Statute.2 1 This was adopted by the majority of the
states and is the most comprehensive of the state laws regulating
dishonest or misleading advertising. The statute imposes crim-
inal penalties for violations, prohibits untrue, deceptive, or mis-
leading advertising of products, services, property, or securities.
It preceded by three years the enactment by Congress of the
Federal Trade Commission Act designed to bar unfair methods
of competition in interstate commerce. (See Table 3.)
There has been a feeling in some quarters that the Printer's
Ink Statute would have received a greater degree of enforcement
if it had provided an alternative injunction feature to take the
place of the present criminal penalty. Printer's Ink drafted a
simple injunction clause and, while not affirmatively advocating
its adoption, has made the alternate provision available to those
states desiring it. 2 2 (See Table 3.)
In 1940 the executive committee of the Association of Food
and Drug Officers of the United States endorsed a model bill, for
enactment by the various states, that closely paralleled the fed-
eral law of the 1938 which amended the 1906 act by including
cosmetics. 23 (See Table 1.)
There are also many statutes governing advertising of other
commodities, e.g., animal feed, alcohol, fertilizer, etc. (See
Table 2.)
The consumer movements have also had their effect by edu-
cating the public, the most noticeable being Consumer's Research
and Consumer's Guide, both of which make recommendations as
to what products are acceptable and live up to their claims.
19 F. T. C. v. Regal Milling Co., 228 U. S. 212, 217 (1933).
20 52 Stat. 114, 15 U. S. C. A. Supp. IV & V (1938).
21 Digges, The Modern Law of Advertising and Marketing 47 (1940). See
also, Kallet, Counterfeit 26 (1935); Printers Ink 80 (August 16, 1957); Id., at
83 (August 23, 1957); Printers Ink 16 (February 21, 1958); Advertising Age
89 (February 10, 1958); Id., at 143 (September 19, 1957); Id., at 119(August 21, 1957); Geller, Advertising at the Crossroads, 258-259 (1952).
22 Ibid.
23 States which have adopted this model bill: Arkansas, California, Con-
necticut, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Ten-
nessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming.
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Questionnaire to Advertising Agencies
In an attempt to find out just what the reaction of the
advertising agencies is to the doctrine of liability as laid down
by the Toni case, the subjoined questionnaire was sent to one
hundred and twenty of the leading advertising agencies in the
United States. Fifty-four replies were received and some of the
results are tabulated within the questionnaire.
"An express warranty is an affirmation of fact by the
seller as to a product or commodity to induce the purchase
thereof, on which affirmation the buyer relies in making the
purchase.
Under modern merchandising practice, where the manu-
facturer of a product in his advertising makes representa-
tions as to the quality and merit of the product aimed directly
at the ultimate consumer and urges the latter to purchase
the product from a retailer, and such ultimate consumer does
so in reliance on and pursuant to the inducements of the
manufacturer and suffers harm in the use of such product
by reason of deleterious ingredients therein, such ultimate
consumer may maintain an action for damages immediately
against the manufacturer on the basis of express warranty,
notwithstanding that there is no direct contractual relation-
ship between them." 24
"1. Since this decision presently applies only to Ohio and a
few other jurisdictions, does it affect your present adver-
tising policies? Yes 5 No 44
If so, How? (For example, what media, etc.) (Majority
answer was that little effect was felt.)
"2. If this ruling should become the law in the majority of
jurisdictions, how will it affect your future advertising
policies (Majority answer was "Not at all.")
"3. Do you believe this decision will unduly restrict adver-
tising claims? Yes 8 No 40
Is it possible such a decision on a nation-wide scale would
eliminate (or reduce) "puffing"? Yes 16 No 28
"4. What is your opinion of the decision? Any comments are
welcome."
Since by far the majority of those answering Question 1 felt
that the Toni decision would not affect their present advertising
policies, the answers to this question were, in general, quite brief.
One commendable comment was:
It is our policy to submit for publication advertising copy
that is factually correct. So strongly have we felt on this
subject, we have lost advertising accounts rather than pro-
duce copy which is false. This applies to all media.
24 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 105 Ohio App. 53 (1957), affd. 167
Ohio St. 244, 147 N. E. 2d 612 (1958).
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In question two, the majority of the replies stated flatly that
it would not affect them at all. However, one claimed that al-
though it would not affect him, it might affect others. Others
thought it might force more careful study of advertising claims:
one stated that it would require making doubly sure that the
product justified all claims and had no harmful ingredients; an-
other that they would have to make sure that the product lived
up to the manufacturer's claims. Only one felt that the decision
would affect his advertising materially if it became the law in
the majority of the jurisdictions. Several mentioned that they
would have the legal aspects of their advertisements checked
more closely before using them, one saying: "The majority of
our copy is now OK'd by the client's lawyer; we would tighten
up to make sure all copy is reviewed." Still another said: "It
might serve as a restraining force on overly enthusiastic copy-
writers, but any reputable agency should warn its clients against
extravagant claims which might involve them in legal actions."
It is interesting to note that only a few of the agencies honestly
admitted that their copy sometimes oversteps the actual facts
upon which the advertisements should be based. The majority
seemed to feel that although their copy was honest, at least some
of the other agencies would meet trouble as a result of the de-
cision, and would have to alter their policies.
The answers to the first part of question 3 were generally
quite brief. Typical comments were: "Restrict, yes, unduly, no";
"Not wrongfully restrictive"; or "It could, depending on the out-
come of test cases." One thought it definitely would restrict the
advertising of "companies who overstate or exaggerate the claims
for their products"; and another said it definitely would restrict
those "with certain types of products, such as cigarettes."
The second part of question 3 evoked much more comment
than any of the preceding questions. In addition to the "yes" and
"no" answers, many explained their reasoning, one stating that
''since no reputable advertising agency will make claims that
cannot be proven, the question is of the 'Have-you-stopped-beat-
ing-your-wife?-Answer-yes-or-no-' type." Several definitions of
puffing were received, such as "true puffing is non-specific," or
that puffery is merely a distinct kind of statement which will be
understood by the public as representing the natural enthusiasm
of the seller. In discussing their answers, such statements as
"There is always a way around for the unscrupulous," and "It
is my judgment that it will continue with those who practice
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss1/7
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stretching the truth" were made. Many thought it might reduce,
but that it certainly would not eliminate it. One commented:
Perhaps in the purely legal sense, but not in the com-
mercial use of the term. So many claims, such as best, most
soothing, longest lasting, etc., cannot be proved or disproved
except arbitrarily. As long as they cause no harm they would
or could not be stopped by legislation unless it were given
a very broad interpretation.
And still another felt that "good advertising puffery should not
be restricted under such legislation."
As to question 4, several were vociferously opposed to the
decision. It was thought by one to be a restrictive, negative ap-
proach to the matter. Another thought it to be limiting and un-
reasonable and that it was seldom possible in advertising to give
the detail necessary to create a clear warranty. While one advised
that the F. T. C. and F. D. A. already control the situation with
adequate policing power (a questionable "fact," but even if true,
it is apparent that these powers are insufficiently used), another
expressed his faith in the F. T. C. and credited the B. B. B. in the
various cities with keeping advertising honest; he further re-
marked that he believed the present laws gave the consumer
adequate protection and voiced his opinion that practically all
advertisers are honest in their advertising and in the manufac-
turing of their products. Another said that most manufacturers
do not intend to put a bad product on the market, but on the
very few occasions when it did happen, everyone made broad,
sweeping statements which did harm to everyone and that
the statements served no good purpose; any legislation beyond
what we already have seemed unnecessary and a waste. Roget's
Thesaurus was apparently used by the person who thought it
"crazy, legalistic, over-cautious, unrealistic, stultifying, incom-
prehensible, comparatively miniscule in potential application be-
cause no manufacturer of substance (sue-able) will deliberately
continue to manufacture a harmful product. It is just another
silly attempt to legislate morals;" he also suggested a law on
compulsory Christianity. And still another referred to the re-
ports of the F. T. C. which found in thousands of advertisements
examined only a fraction of one percent worthy of desist orders.
He further advised that our approach was somewhat offensive to
him personally and to his profession. As research director of his
agency he "watch dogged" clients' claims to make sure that they
did not misrepresent. He also made it clear that one cannot build
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1959
ADVERTISED PRODUCTS-ADVERTISING LAW
a business on falsehood or bad goods. He ended with this state-
ment: "I could draft a similar questionnaire about lawyers with
yes and no fill-ins that as evidence would de-bar you."
The majority of the replies, however, were favorable to the
decision. Thus, it was thought to be "a good decision based on
moral behavior. I can't see how it would possibly harm anyone
honest;" "a good decision, manufacturers should stand back of
their products;" "Sound, all manufacturers should be irrevocably
bound by their warranty and advertising claim and assurances."
Another said that if it tends to curtail untrue or exaggerated
advertising-it will serve a very useful purpose. Other com-
ments: "good-will make claims agree with facts"; "the decision
is a very good one. Most advertisers and agencies welcome it
and will be unaffected by it because it will concern only that
fringe group of questionable advertisements. It will weed out
the undesirables which is to everyone's benefit." Still another
believed it to be justified and that the manufacturer should
clearly indicate or warn against any possible harmful effects.
The opinion was also expressed that "the decision is sound on the
privity point and is no surprise. All fictions eventually give way."
However, there is "the danger that liability may be found even
though the label provides all appropriate disclosures and warn-
ings," and that "in such a case the injured party should not pre-
vail because of his own contributory negligence." One com-
mented generally, saying:
It is a good decision if justly and intelligently enforced.
There is too much hypocrisy and exaggerated claims in ad-
vertising. Truth in advertising has always been a part of
true success. It's ironic that law must step in to make truth
essential, but maybe it's high time.
Summarizing, he continued:
Basically, I don't like to see the law step in to correct
a condition that advertisers and their agencies should be
eager to correct themselves. The facts remain, however, that
they haven't been able to correct it . . . nor, in many in-
stances, willing to do so.
Advertising has made big strides in correcting many of
its earlier abuses, and many advertisers and agencies have
long recognized the impact of truth and restraint. Unfor-
tunately, these advertisers and agencies suffer from the false-
hoods, puffery and hypocrisy of the others, and the impact
of advertising is being impaired by a minority.
So it is that a respected member of the advertising profession
himself refutes many, if not all, of the arguments expressed by
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss1/7
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those opposed to the decision, and points out, in a frank ap-
praisal of the advertising business, the necessity for such re-
straints as those advocated in this article.
Absolute Liability
From the foregoing, it is obvious that there have been a great
many attempts to police the advertising of products and to protect
the public from fraudulent and misleading claims. It is equally
apparent from the numerous TV commercials, magazine and
other advertisements that government regulations and consumer
attempts at control are definitely inadequate.
The F. T. C. cease and desist orders and the post office stop
orders can affect only future advertising. In the meantime, the
advertiser has already put across the point which he wished to
make, to as many as fifty million people in one week.25 The
slap on the wrist he receives from the F. T. C. or the Post Office
Department has no real deterrent value in stopping others from
attempting the same thing, or indeed in stopping the same person
from trying again under another name or with another product.26
In the first six months of 1958, the number of complaints re-
ceived by the Better Business Bureaus on misleading advertising
increased 30% over the corresponding period of 1957.27 Perhaps
this was due to the status of the general economy during those
months, as there is invariably a sharp rise in unethical advertising
and selling practice during recession periods. Borderline firms
will stoop to almost anything to "make a fast buck." Moreover,
even some ethical companies are tempted to resort to unsound
practice in competition for the consumer dollar. The most flagrant
misrepresentations uncovered by the Better Business Bureau in
recent months have been the persistent uses of bait advertising,
whereby a dealer will advertise a non-existent automobile, for
25 Supra n. 9.
26 Some of the companies involved and their products which are currently
under Post Office stop orders are: Brochim Company, N. Y., "Royaljel Cap-
sules" (restoration of sex virility in men, restoration of youthful sex func-
tions in women, rejuvenation of failing or worn-out glandular activities in
humans); Nature Food Centres, Cambridge, Mass., "Bu-Royale Capsules"
(increase of life span); Owen Laboratories, Chicago, "Enerjol Capsules"
(normalization of growth in underdeveloped children); U. S. Bio-Genics
Corp., N. Y., "Royljel Formula 101" (cure for low blood pressure and a
variety of other conditions); Rojelle Pharmacal Co., Chicago, "Rojilan
Formula 66 Capsules" (providing an anti-aging effect, restoration of youth
and vigor).
27 B. B. B. Spotlight, N. Y. C., 1 (July 1958).
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example, or an automobile he has no intention of selling, in
order to get the buying public to come to his lot. Others fre-
quently used are the fictitious price, the false fire sale, etc.
28
There are examples of absolute liability in our statutes and
our common law which have been accepted and applauded, such
as the Unemployment Compensation Acts and the liability of the
common carrier and innkeeper. The philosophy has been devel-
oping, for many years, that compensation should be recovered
when a person receives injuries due to a defective product; and
thus recovery has become increasingly easier to obtain from the
manufacturer.29
So also the need to hold a manufacturer liable for his false
and misleading advertising has long been recognized, and here
too, recovery has become increasingly easier.
Certain types of advertisements have been held to be binding
offers to sell. Generally speaking, an advertisement may be bind-
ing when it contains specific facts that require no further nego-
tiations regarding price, quantity, quality, delivery, etc.30 Ad-
vertisements omitting details of this nature are in most instances
merely invitations to trade and are not binding.31
In Baton Rouge, Louisiana, an automobile dealer placed the
following advertisement in a local newspaper: "Two for one.
Buy a '54 Ford now. Trade even for a '55. When the 1955 Models
come out, will trade even for your '54."
A customer read this advertisement and bought a 1954 Ford
sedan. When the '55 models were advertised for sale, he offered
to return the car he had purchased in exchange for the new
model. He was informed that the advertisement was not an
offer but an invitation to "come in and bargain." The customer
sued to recover judgment against the dealer for the difference
between the value of the car he had bought and the one the
dealer had advertised that he would deliver. "Such an accept-
ance of an offer," said the court, "makes a valid and binding con-
tract. The advertiser was bound by the offer he made in ex-
change for the act which the buyer performed." 32
28 Simon, The Law for Advertising and Marketing (1956).
29 Condron, Product Liability, 23 Insur. Counsel J. 176 (1956).
N0 R. E. Cummer & Co. v. Nuveen, 147 F. 2d 3, 157 A. L. R. 739 (7th Cir.,
1945).
31 Nebraska Seed Co. v. Hirsh, 98 Neb. 89, 152 N. W. 310 (1915).
32 Johnson v. Capital Ford City Co., 85 S. 2d 75 (La., 1955).
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Again, in Lefkovitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 3 3 a
merchant advertised three fur coats for sale at one dollar each,
on a "first come first serve" basis. The first customer to arrive
offered one dollar and demanded a fur coat. The merchant refused
to deliver it, and the customer sued. The merchant contended in
court that his advertised offer could be withdrawn at any time.
The court awarded judgment to the customer for the value of the
coat. The court held that the test whether an advertisement is an
offer or merely an invitation to trade is "whether the facts show
that some performance was promised in positive terms in return
for something requested. . . . The advertisement was a definite
offer and became a binding contract when the customer offered
the one dollar to the dealer and asked for the coat. The offer was
clear, definite and explicit." 34
The results of a series of tests by the Better Business
Bureaus, to compare the list price and actual selling price in the
electrical appliance field, led Robert Parrise, Secretary of the
F. T. C., to contend that many manufacturers' list prices are just
so much fiction. He said: "The Commission has found that the
public believes the term 'list price' to be the usual and ordinary
retail price of such an article and that any dealings by which a
price reduction is obtained below such list price represents sav-
ings from regular retail prices. . . . It is up to the responsible
manufacturer and dealer to see to it that the public's belief and
confidence in advertising is not destroyed by the continual use
of fictitious list prices and phony pre-ticketing." 35
Although there have been no test cases on the fictitious list
price, there have been a number where determination of whether
the advertisement was misleading or not was the principal ques-
tion.36 The F. T. C. requires that the advertisement be tested in
the atmosphere and under the circumstances in which it is in-
tended to be used.37 The F. T. C. is deemed to be expert in deal-
ing with these matters and thus is entitled to draw upon its own
33 56 N. W. 2d 689 (Minn., 1957).
34 Id. at 691. See also Oliver v. Henley, 21 S. W. 2d 576 (Tex. App. 1929);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Johnson, 209 Mass. 89, 95 N. E. 290 (1911).
35 B. B. B. Periodical, Philadelphia, 2 (August 1957).
36 Alberty v. F. T. C., 118 F. 2d 669 (9th Cir., 1941); Rhodes Pharmacal Co.,
Inc., v. F. T. C., 208 F. 2d 382 (7th Cir., 1953); Thomas Quilt Factories v
F. T. C., 116 F. 2d 347 (10th Cir., 1940). Also see cases collected 2 C. C. H.,
Par. 5095.80.
37 F. T. C. v. National Health Aids, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 340 (D. C. Md., 1952).
For tests of false and misleading advertising, see Do's and Don'ts in Ad-
vertising Copy, published by the National Better Business Bureau.
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experience in order to determine, in the absence of consumer
testimony, the nature and probable result of the use of advertis-
ing expressions.3 It is not required to sample public opinion in
order to determine what meaning is conveyed to the public by the
particular advertisements. 39
The important criterion in determining whether a product is
falsely advertised is the impression which the advertisement is
likely to make on the general populace.40 Since the law is not
made for the protection of experts, but for the public-which
includes "the ignorant, the unthinking, etc." 41-an advertisement
may be technically truthful but still be misleading.4 2 The ad-
vertisement must also be considered as a whole, and those which
are capable of two meanings, one of which is false, are considered
misleading.43
Thus it is that there is a growing body of law, and a group
of experts, deemed capable of determining whether or not an
advertisement is false and misleading. Although the courts have
granted recovery upon a claim of negligent advertising in a few
instances in the past,44 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.4 5 is
one of the first cases to place liability squarely on the manufac-
turer, for the protection of the innocent purchaser who buys in
reliance on the manufacturer's advertised claims. It would seem
only logical that the body of experts and even much of the law,
as illustrated above, could be utilized in civil actions, so that a
manufacturer could be held liable for his false claims for a prod-
uct that injures its user.
38 F. T. C. v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U. S. 304, 54 S. Ct. 423, 78 L. Ed.
814 (1934).
39 Zenith Radio Corp. v. F. T. C., 143 F. 2d 29 (7th Cir., 1944).
40 Charles of the Ritz Dist. Corp. v. F. T. C., 143 F. 2d 676 (2d Cir., 1944);
P. Lorillard Co. v. F. T. C., 186 F. 2d 52 (2d Cir., 1950).
41 Florence Manufacturing Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir.,
1910). And for other cases describing the public, see 2 C. C. H., Par. 5081.
42 Ford Motor Co. v. F. T. C., 120 F. 2d 175 (7th Cir., 1941). Cf., Consoli-
dated Book Publishers v. F. T. C., 53 F. 2d 942 (7th Cir., 1931).
43 U. S. v. 95 Barrels of Vinegar, 265 U. S. 438, 44 S. Ct. 529, 68 L. Ed. 1094
(1924). Cf., C. Howard Hunt Pen Co. v. F. T. C., 197 F. 2d 273 (3rd Cir.,
1952).
44 Wright v. Carter Products Co., 244 F. 2d 53 (2d Cir., 1957); Crist v. Art
Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N. Y. S. 496 (1930) (absolutely harm-
less toy gun); Henry v. Crook, 202 App. Div. 19, 195 N. Y. S. 642 (1922)
(harmless sparklers); Rosenbush v. Ambrosia Milk Corp., 181 App. Div. 96,
168 N. Y. S. 505 (1917) (absolutely safe drink); Marsh v. Usk Hardware Co.,
73 Wash. 543, 132 P. 241 (1913) (absolutely safe explosion). Cf., E. I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 13 F. 2d 26 (8th Cir., 1934).
45 105 Ohio App. 53 (1957); affd. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N. E. 2d 612 (1958).
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Ala.
Alaska
Ariz.
Ark.
Cal.
TABLE 3. STATUTES GOVERNING FALSE AND
MISLEADING ADVERTISING
Printers' Ink Statute Special Provisions
tit. 14, § 211
§ 44-1481 b
Bus. & Prof. §§ 17500, 17500.1,
17534-17535a
Colo. §§ 40-15-1, -2
Conn. § 8703
Del.
D. C. §§ 22-1411, -1413
Fla. § 817.06b
Ga.
Hawaii §§11373, 11374
Idaho § 18-3112Ill. § 37.195
Ind. § 10-2110
Iowa § 713.24
Kan. §§ 21-1112 to -1114
Ky. § 434.270
La. § 51:411
Me. c. 133, § 29b
Md. art. 27, § 1958
Mass. c. 266, § 91a
Mich. § 750.33
Minn. § 620.52
Miss.
Mo. § 561.660
Mont. §§ 94-1818 to -1821
Neb. §§ 28-1235, -1236
Nev. § 10529
N. H. c. 580, § 9a
N.J.
N.M.
N. Y. Pen. Law § 421
N. C. § 14-117 b
N. D. § 51-1201
Ohio §§ 2911.41, .42
Okla. tit. 21, § 1502
Ore. § 646.810 (1)
Pa. tit. 18, 4857 a
R. I. §§ 11-18-10, -11
S. C. § 66-3b
S. D. § 13.4201a
Tenn. § 39-1910a
Tex. Pen. Code art. 1554a
Utah § 76-4-1 a
Vt. § 8324a
Va. § 18-189
Wash. § 9.04.010
W. Va. § 5979
Wis. § 100.18
Wyo. § 9-904
Knowledge required
b Deceit required
c Misrepresentation of value
d Bait advertising
e Misrepresenting producer
f Misrepresenting dealer
§ 4 4 -14 2 3d
Pen. Code § 2886, 2887, 2890e,
Bus. & Prof. Code §175311,
§§ 17531.5, 17533.5g, § 17534g,
§ 17535gik
tit. 6, §§ 2501, 2503 h
§ 11373cd, § 11374k, § 11375 i
§§ 35-4016, -40171
c. 133, § 29d
art. 27, § 198d
c. 266, § 9lAd
§ 750.33d
Pen. Law § 421-a f , § 421-dg
§ 2911.42k
§ 646.210 (b) d, § 646.820g,
§ 646.840e
tit. 18, § 4857cf, tit. 69, § 162h
§ 11-18-12k
§ 13.4201-
§ 39-1945d, §§ 6-714, -720, -724 h
Pen. Code art. 1037 (G) c,
art. 141J
§ 13-5-8d, § 76-4-2 f, § 76-4-41,
§ 76-4-5 h, § 76-36-1e
§ 18-1909, §§ 18-189, 54-815h
§ 100.18 (3) f, § 23.25J, §§ 100.18,
20.21k
§ 37-1603 h
g War surplus or military goods
misrepresentation
h Fire or bankruptcy sales
misrepresentation
I Not stating defective goods
J Miscellaneous
k Injunction provisions
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